Utilitarianism

[droqen]

Re: John Stuart Mill's
"Utilitarianism"

[droqen]

7

. . . the being whose capacities for enjoyment are low has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied. . .
. . . a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness he can look for, given how the world is, is imperfect. . . .
. . . he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are bearable; and they won't make him envy the person who isn't conscious of the imperfections . . .
. . . the fool or the pig . . know only their own side of the question. The [highly endowed being] knows both sides.

Mill's argument gives me some hope... much needed. There is some other writing on previous pages regarding this point, but I think this catches the necessary component. If every being capable of knowing both pleasures, with experience of both, chooses one over the other, then we can understand it as qualitatively higher in a truly meaningful way. This is what is meant, by maximizing happiness, well laid out.

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7

In most people a capacity for the nobler feelings is a very tender plant that is easily killed. . .

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9

. . . tranquility and excitement. Many people find that when they have much tranquility they can be content with very little pleasure; and many find that when they have much excitement they can put up with a considerable quantity of pain. It is certainly possible that a man--and even the mass of mankind--should have both tranquility and excitement.

There is something so incredibly hopeful, about this. I can feel myself floating.

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Switching over to Utilitarianism and Other Essays (mentioned here for page number reference clarity)

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292

Utilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow of them their full worth. . . .

they are. . . of opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people. . .

Utilitarianism judges actions, outcomes. Mill talks about this from the perspective of and any all moral structures... I
suppose that in my mind the argument being made is that utilitarianism is more measurable, less concerned with what goes on in people's heads. It judges outcomes. I appreciate this practical take; it may be on an individual level stressful, but it's not meant to be applied to every single action (and he says this explicitly -- "ninety nine out of a hundred" actions will not & ought not be judged on a moral basis), but as a compass, it is the only one that makes sense.

What does good is good.

This is not the entire foundation upon which utilitarianism is constructed... but it is a piece of the structure, the ground beneath, the Earth itself. What does good is good. Then what does it mean for something to do good? Utilitarianism seeks to answer this question.

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293

It may not be superfluous to notice a few of the more common misapprehensions . . . even [especially?] those which are so obvious and gross that it might appear impossible for any person of candour and intelligence to fall into them: since persons, even of considerable mental endowments, often give themselves so little trouble to understand the bearings of any opinion against which they entertain a prejudice. . .

. . . men are in general so little conscious of this voluntary ignorance as a defect, that the vulgarest misunderstandings of ethical doctrines are continually met with in the deliberate writings of persons of the greatest pretensions both to high principle and to philosophy.

killer.

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argh i'm close to the end but i feel a need to revisit something from earlier. truly, what is meant in this essay by 'greater happiness' or pleasure.

279-280

. . . what makes one pleasure more valuable than another[?]

. . . there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.

. . . by those who are competently acquainted with both . . .
. . . one . . . placed so far above the other that they prefer it . . .
. . . even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent . . .
. . . and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of.

We can construct a statement that describes, though does not necessarily prove, the existence of pleasures as above others in terms of sheer "quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account."

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282

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I believe there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, . . . the judgement of those who are qualified by knowledge of both. . . must be admitted as final.

There is an extra clause which I removed, "or, if they differ, that of the majority among them"; I believe that all valid judgements must agree, although I am more liberal than some when it comes to invalidation of judgements. A mere majority is not, ever, sufficient.

edit:: I understand the practical considerations of appeal to majority -- it is a loose, rough, but inexpensive discarding of noise. Were we to study every individual case of disagreement in depth in order to determine how (and whether) to invalidate it, there would be no arriving at a conclusion. Still, we are here in the land of make-believe, of ideals; I wish that Mill's Utilitarianism presented a competent counterpoint to my present position, or else acknowledged that perfect consensus is desirable but not practical. In any case, I cannot abide by this unqualified reliance upon majority.

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back to the present -- back to the last few pages before Chapter III.

295

. . . defenders of utility often find themselves called upon to reply to such objections as . . . there is not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general happiness.

. . .

The answer to the object is, that there has been ample time, namely, the whole past duration of the human species.

in this statement is a qualification that i have been looking for for the value of art, of stories, of, say, imaginary conundrums. not all of them, of course, but the mass of them, what is the purpose of art? art as part of human history, of human culture, encodes within it sticky ideas which take part in the mass that is human knowledge... this is civilization.

works play a part in this grand amalgam harmony,
which on the whole guides all of human action.

nothing could be more important than this. though the role that art plays is not clear, i can say without reservation that i do believe it plays some part, and i may wish to spend a greater part of my life in pursuit of a more meaningful impact upon this mass, of which some, but only some, part is a pursuit of a greater understanding of it.

..

People talk as if the commencement of this course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another, he had to begin considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human happiness.

There is a vessel by which humanity carries a lack of such ignorance to each such 'man'. Mill suggests that members of such a vessel include (296) "notions . . taught to the young", "law", and "opinion". I do not believe he presents or seeks to present an exhaustive taxonomy of elements, only example delivery mechanisms which participate in this 'mass' or 'vessel', as I have called it above.

(civilization and human knowledge, the 'massive vessel'...)

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this second chapter ends with a long passage on how any set of second-order ethical/moral laws will, must, leave room for individual judgement: human life is complicated. in the case of utilitarianism, the 'first principle' of maximizing happiness acts as a singular "umpire" which may be called upon by the individual adjudicator in these spaces where ambiguity exists.

i hope that makes sense. it makes sense in my head, but it's hard to describe; i am not sure whether what i have written serves as either a good explanation (for one who has forgotten or never known what is contained on these pages) or as a good mnemonic for reminding the familiar self (which is my preference), but it is what i have written.