292

QuoteUtilitarians are quite aware that there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are perfectly willing to allow of them their full worth. . . .

they are. . . of opinion, that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. This makes them unpopular with many people. . .

Utilitarianism judges actions, outcomes. Mill talks about this from the perspective of and any all moral structures... I
suppose that in my mind the argument being made is that utilitarianism is more measurable, less concerned with what goes on in people's heads. It judges outcomes. I appreciate this practical take; it may be on an individual level stressful, but it's not meant to be applied to every single action (and he says this explicitly -- "ninety nine out of a hundred" actions will not & ought not be judged on a moral basis), but as a compass, it is the only one that makes sense.

What does good is good.

This is not the entire foundation upon which utilitarianism is constructed... but it is a piece of the structure, the ground beneath, the Earth itself. What does good is good. Then what does it mean for something to do good? Utilitarianism seeks to answer this question.

Switching over to Utilitarianism and Other Essays (mentioned here for page number reference clarity)

9

Quote. . . tranquility and excitement. Many people find that when they have much tranquility they can be content with very little pleasure; and many find that when they have much excitement they can put up with a considerable quantity of pain. It is certainly possible that a man--and even the mass of mankind--should have both tranquility and excitement.

There is something so incredibly hopeful, about this. I can feel myself floating.

7

QuoteIn most people a capacity for the nobler feelings is a very tender plant that is easily killed. . .

7

Quote. . . the being whose capacities for enjoyment are low has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied. . .
. . . a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness he can look for, given how the world is, is imperfect. . . .
. . . he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are bearable; and they won't make him envy the person who isn't conscious of the imperfections . . .
. . . the fool or the pig . . know only their own side of the question. The [highly endowed being] knows both sides.

Mill's argument gives me some hope... much needed. There is some other writing on previous pages regarding this point, but I think this catches the necessary component. If every being capable of knowing both pleasures, with experience of both, chooses one over the other, then we can understand it as qualitatively higher in a truly meaningful way. This is what is meant, by maximizing happiness, well laid out.

this "play" is the conspicuous consumption of free time.

it is the proof and yet also its contradiction.

to "play" in this sense is not to be free or to pursue freedom, but to display freedom, to oneself and to others.

play is the aesthetic of freedom.

so, to attempt a restatement, i am against the fetishization of play, not the act itself or its actors. if we are to obsessively fetishize over some aspect of the human experience as self-evidently worthwhile...

well, perhaps there is no good pick. but play would not be my choice.

so, as with "kill gameplay," i am in danger of making another on its face absurd and too-extreme claim, which upon examination unfurls into something with more nuance — is the sharpness, or perhaps the bluntness, necessary?

i am not opposed to the concept at which the word "play" seems to point, but i am opposed to such pointing, and its consequences.

this is of course what modern science & technology does in nearly every arena, as i have known it:

find something valuable and seek to understand it and its context as little as possible: isolate, isolate, isolate.

our great big machine enables and rewards such an impulse.

my starting point is that play is endemic of freedom. to question the value of play, then, unexamined, is to question the value of freedom, which is not my position.

(i do think an open approach to the possibility of its asking—what is the value of freedom?—could yield interesting results, but it is not what i am doing at present)

my claim is that seeking to manufacture play undermines the very environment which gives birth to the thing we value itself.

when i bring up kill gameplay, a common response that i haven't yet found a way to deal with is "but what about play?"

i have found myself irritated by these lines of conversation more often that not. indeed, what about play?

the word itself held in such high regard, to question it seems ridiculous. it is very attached to the idea of a thing "done for its own sake," which is another conceptual construction i encounter frequently and which irritates me more overtly.

what could possibly be a less useful tautology than claiming a thing is done for its own sake?

it is not.

[AB]